This paper introduces household production and the production of houses into a standard model of monetary exchange, and uses it to study the relationship between monetary policy and housing markets. Theory predicts in ‡ation, as a tax on market activity, encourages substitution into household production, and thus encourages investment in houses. We show analytically that in the model the appropriately-de ‡ated value of the housing stock is increasing with in ‡ation or nominal interest rates. We show empirically that this is true in the data, using various sources for the U.S. and other countries. The calibrated model accounts for 20 to 50 percent of the observed relationships between home values and in ‡ation or interest rates. It also implies that the cost of in ‡ation is higher than predicted by models without home production.
Introduction
This paper reports the results of our research in monetary economics applied to the housing market, including some novel data analysis, a new theory, and a calibration exercise. In fact, the theory is not so much new as a combination of three existing literatures. The basic framework follows the now standard approach to the microfoundations of monetary theory, sometimes called New Monetarist Economics, that provides benchmark models of money, credit, banking and so on. Into this we introduce the theory of household production, since we believe it is best to think about home capital (residential structures and consumer durables) as a factor of production, parallel to the way economists think about market capital (nonresidential structures and producer durables, or plant and equipment). Then we import features from the literature that studies the production of homes, because we are interested in the supply side as well as the demand side of the housing market.
Although each of these elements is part of mainstream macroeconomics, they have not been previously interrelated. 1 As one motivation for the project, consider the often-heard view that there is a connection between monetary policy and housing markets. While there may be several ways to think about such a connection, one is the common notion that housing is a good hedge against inflation. This notion is vague, but the interpretation adopted here is simply that the value of housing increases when inflation is higher.
By a hedge, we do not mean that one can use housing to avoid inflation risk, although that may also be interesting; the idea is rather that having more housing allows one 1 Since we are combining several different literatures, it is hard to list every relevant paper. On the microfoundations of monetary economics, we discuss below the work on which we build directly, but for recent surveys see Nosal and Rocheteau (2011) and Williamson and Wright (2010) . On home production, there are surveys by Greenwood et al. (1995) and Gronau (1997) , but since then there has been a lot of other work, much of which we mention below. We also review some housing research, but an example of what we have in mind is Davis and Heathcote (2005) .
to partially avoid some of the effects of anticipated inflation. A goal of the paper is to make this precise, but to get some intuition, consider the so-called Tobin effect that says that inflation makes agents want to substitute out of cash and into capital.
Our effect is similar except we focus on household instead of market capital. To put it slightly differently, in many macro models inflation makes agents want to substitute out of consumption and into leisure; our model allows them to substitute into household production.
While part of the objective is methodological -integrate approaches from different literatures into a framework that may be useful in a variety of applications -we also want to discuss some substantive issues. First we check the facts. Using various data sources for the U.S. and other countries, we document that housing values are indeed positively related to inflation after deflating by an appropriate measure, such as nominal output or the money supply (one has to scale home values by something, of course, since we mean to say more than "prices go up with inflation"). We also find that housing values over nominal output or over the money supply are positively related to nominal interest rates, which makes sense in the context of the model, where the usual Fisher Equation implies that nominal interest and inflation rates move together. Since the Fisher Equation is a reasonable empirical approximation in the medium to long run, but not an exact relationship, we look at both inflation and interest rates. The evidence convinces us that appropriately-deflated values of the housing stock are positively related to both of these monetary variables, especially the nominal interest rate.
Although it is possible to think of alternative explanations for this evidence, we pursue the idea that inflation is a tax on market activity. This is surely relevant for high-inflation cash-intensive economies, but it is also interesting to explore the channel for the U.S. economy. Inflation has been low here for a while, but the 1970's runup and subsequent decline in U.S. inflation provide plenty of variation in the data. And in terms of how cash intensive the U.S. is -or, more to the point, was over the period -note that inflation impacts not only currency but also many other assets. 2 By way of example, inflation provides an incentive to go out for dinner less, and eat more meals at home, as long as going out is relatively cash intensive. Now, not all market activity uses cash, but it uses cash more than household activity, since goods like home-cooked meals are not even traded, let alone traded using a medium of exchange. Thus, inflation increases the demand for home-production inputs, both time and capital, and so the value of housing increases with inflation, in part through prices but also through quantities as construction catches up.
Another reason for integrating these literatures is the following. One of the classic questions in monetary economics asks about the effect of inflation on welfare.
One should think that the answer will be affected by incorporating home production into the analysis, given that much previous work has shown that adding household production into otherwise standard models makes a significant difference for quantitative questions. 3 Typically, the main impact of incorporating home production is that it changes the amount by which agents respond to changes in policy and other forcing variables. In the neoclassical growth theory, agents can substitute between leisure and labor, and between consumption and investment. In that model 2 See Venkateswaran and Wright (2013) for a model that makes this point qualitatively and quantitatively. From an even broader viewpoint, inflation may be a proxy for all kinds of problems in markets, even if in the formal model it is a more narrow liquid-asset tax . 3 Benhabib et al. (1991) and Greenwood and Hercowicz (1991) put the ideas of Becker (1965 Becker ( ,1988 into business-cycle models, and show they match key business-cycle moments better than models without home production. Home production models also better explain consumption ( extended to include home production, agents can substitute between leisure and working in the market or working in the home, and between consumption and investment in market capital or investment in home capital. It has been shown that this significantly affects the quantitative impact of fiscal policy (by several of the papers in fn. 3). We want to know how it affects the impact of monetary policy.
To implement these ideas the model of money and capital in Aruoba et al. (2011) is generalized to include housing. Like capital, housing is both produced and used in production. In terms of analytic results, we prove several sharp propositions formalizing our intuition about inflation and home production. We then ask how well a calibrated version of the model captures the above-mentioned empirical findings.
The answer is that it accounts for between 20 and 50 percent of the observed relationship between appropriately-deflated home values, on the one hand, and inflation or nominal interest rates, on the other. This shows our channel is economically relevant, yet still leaves room for other theories to play a role. It is also important to understand that the objective is not to explain 100 percent; it is to show how the model can be used to measure the size of certain effects, without prejudice as to whether they are big or small. Similarly, we show that the welfare cost of inflation is higher, but not that much higher, than in similar models without home production.
Again the goal is not to make this number big or small, but to investigate the impact of including home production in the analysis.
It is important here to be clear about our methods. We generate quantitative predictions from the theory in the counterfactual situation where the only impulses are changes in inflation or interest rates. Certainly we not because we believe taxes, technology and so on are irrelevant, but we want a controlled experiment, changing one variable holding all else fixed. This is not the only approach, obviously, but it has much precedent, including the standard practice in macro of asking what a model can explain based only on technology shocks. Also, one can quibble with the choice of any particular statistic, but we think the value of housing -price times quantity -is the best option. While prices and quantities can also be analyzed separately, as can any number of other variables, our choice is dictated by theory, which makes sharp predictions about the appropriately-deflated product of price and quantity. The empirical objects of interest were selected based on the predictions of the theory, not to make the model and data line up (after all, we only account for 20 to 50 percent).
We also emphasize the paper is not about business cycles, but medium-to longrun phenomena, and so we focus primarily on differences across steady states. It is easy to simulate the model with technology, monetary and other shocks and look at high-frequency behavior, but that would be a distraction for present purposes. We do not believe that a blip up in the CPI in one month causes people to abandon the market for home production; we do believe that if people find themselves faced with permanently higher inflation, at the margin they may choose less market and more household activity. Sometimes, if one is interested in longer-run issues, one filters the data before computing statistics. Since we use annual (or lower frequency) data, and the series on scaled home values is fairly smooth, anyway, filtering does not affect the results too much. Hence, results are presented without filtering. Relatedly, we mention that the theory is not inconsistent with high-frequency evidence suggesting that monetary-policy shocks are associated with expansions rather than contractions in market activity. Over longer horizons, inflation and nominal interest rates move together, and the hypothesis that increases in these rates are bad for market activity at low frequencies does not logically contradict any business-cycle facts. 4 In terms of other work, there are several papers on the relationship between inflation and the stock market, which is related in that equity and housing are both alternatives to monetary assets. 5 Research analyzing housing and inflation through effects on mortgages include Kearl (1979) , Follain (1982) and Poterba (1991 below. This suggests focusing on the period up to the turn of the millennium, but for completeness, we look at data both pre-and post-2000.
Piazessi and Schneider (2010) assume inflation taxes the returns to financial assets but not housing. This is complementary, too, although their model is very different. To highlight two differences: first, our monetary theory is built on relatively firm microfoundations; second, we incorporate home production explicitly.
The first is relevant because we think of the paper as a contribution to monetary economics at least as much as a contribution to housing economics. The second is relevant because we also think the paper is a contribution to home production theory, and because when we study housing markets this allows us to take advantage of many results from that research (e.g., estimates of the elasticity between home and market goods). Finally, although our model has frictional goods markets, which are essential for modeling money rigorously, in contrast to some recent papers housing here is traded in frictionless markets. Actual markets for houses are far from frictionless, of course, just like actual markets for factories, but to concentrate on other issues, in this project we assume that home and market capital are traded perfect markets, as in the standard neoclassic growth model. 6 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the data.
Sections 3 and 4 discuss the model and define equilibrium. Section 5 proves the propositions. Section 6 presents the calibration exercise. Section 7 concludes.
The Data
Here we present the case that the inflation and nominal interest rates are positively related to the value of home capital, scaled by nominal output or by the money supply, to correct for purely nominal increases. We first examine the U.S., then other countries. For the U.S. we consider several measures of the value of home capital, each defined by an estimate of the value of the housing stock (price times quantity) plus durable goods. We add durable goods because we think of home capital more broadly than just housing, even if housing is the majority (about 34). Data sources are discussed in some detail in the text, but more information is given in the Appendix. All figures are at the end of the paper.
United States
Our first estimate of housing wealth uses data from Davis and Heathcote (2007), DH for short. This is a relatively short sample, starting in 1975, but is considered 6 The growing body of research on frictional housing markets includes Wheaton (1990) quite accurate. Figure 1 shows time series and color-coded scatter plots for home capital over nominal output vs inflation, home capital over nominal output vs the nominal rate, home capital over the money supply vs inflation, and home capital over money vs the nominal rate. It also reports correlations and semi-elasticities. As in related work on home production, our measure of output is GDP minus rents paid to housing services. Our measure of money is the M1S series that adjusts M1 for the practice since the 1990s of "sweeping" checkable deposits into overnight money market accounts (Cynamon et al. 2006 ). For inflation we use the appropriately adjusted GDP deflator, and for the nominal rate we use T-bills. We consider both inflation and interest rates, even though the Fisher Equation predicts they should move together in theory, because they do not cohere perfectly in practice. lending can generate bubbles with housing-fueled expansions and collapses. 7 As will be shown, generally the relationships with interest rates are stronger than those with inflation. One reason may be that nominal interest rates capture long-term expected inflation better than current inflation rates, especially during episodes with price controls.
The framework presented here does not have home-equity loans, and we do not think of it as a model of bubbles. While it may be interesting in future work to extend the theory in that direction, it is obviously also legitimate to see what it has to say about more "normal" times. This suggests that it may be reasonable to stop the sample at the end of the last millennium. We should also mention some empirical work by Brunnemeier and Julliard (2007).
They ask if nominal interest rates forecast one-period-ahead price-rent ratios. The answer is yes, and the relationship is negative and statistically significant. They also ask if nominal interest rates forecast deviations of the price-rent ratio from trend.
Again the answer is yes, and the relationship is negative and significant at up to four years. Are these findings inconsistent with our results? No. For one thing, price-rent ratios are not the same as value-income ratios, which are the objects of interest here -e.g., the former may reflect discount factors, while the latter reflect the desirability of housing (price times quantity) relative to one's budget. Moreover, we are less interested in one-period-ahead forecasting, or forecast errors, than in long-run relationships. Their results may simply be picking up action at frequencies other than those that matter for our purposes. 9 To reiterate, we are interested in the value of home capital scaled by either nominal output or M1S, and we want to know how this is related to inflation and to nominal interest rates. We are less interested in house prices, or house prices relative to some general price index, because (as we soon show) theory is less definitive about those. Several U.S. data sets indicate that appropriately-scaled values of home capital are positively related to inflation and interest rates. Although the exact semi-elasticities vary, the pattern is usually fairly clear, and when it is less clear, like in the first half of the last century, this may be understandable in terms of events like the Depression, wars and price controls.
Other Countries
Data on housing wealth prior to 1990, and certainly prior to 1980, are virtually nonexistent outside the U.S. However, various estimates of prices have been constructed for several countries. As we said, we prefer price times quantity, but for most countries prices are all we have. Figure 6 presents house prices over nominal output vs inflation for 16 countries, where now we do not distinguish pre-and post-2000, since the boom and bust are less apparent in these economies than in the U.S.
We have direct source data for Belgium, France, Ireland, Switzerland and the UK. 9 It is also worth noting that their  2 values are in the 10% range and their  statistice are in the 2 to 3 range, so it is not as if their evidence is overwhelming. Still, their results are interesting, and it may be useful in future work to understand better how they relate to our findings.
For the remaining countries, we use 1971-2009 data from the Bank for International
Settlements (see Andre 2010) . We are less sure about BIS data, since we do not know the original sources, but we checked price growth against source data for the five economies mentioned above, and they align well, giving us some confidence.
The bottom line is that there is a positive relationship in 13 out of the 16 countries.
To conclude, most sources of information we found, and we made an effort to cast our net widely, point to similar conclusions: there is a positive relationship between appropriately-scaled house values, or house prices when we could not get values, and either inflation rates or nominal interest rates. The rest of the paper presents one way of accounting for this evidence. 10 
The Model
Time is discrete and continues forever. Each period has two subperiods with distinct markets. There is a [0 1] continuum of homogeneous households, a [0 ] continuum of retail firms, and a [0 1] set of production firms. There is also a government that controls the money supply  and levies lump sum tax  . In the first subperiod's market, production firms hire labor and capital from households, at nominal prices  and , to make output . Households purchase  for direct consumption, and for investment in home and market capital. Retailers purchase  and transform it into a different good , to sell in the second-subperiod market. Households discount at rate  = 1 − 1  0 across periods, but not across subperiods. Within-period utility is
where   ,   and   are consumption in the first market, consumption in the second (retail) market, and nonmarket (home) consumption, while   and   are market and nonmarket labor hours.
Having utility linear in labor keeps the analysis tractable, as discussed below.
Also, for analytic results we can eliminate   and have only two goods, but it is useful to have   in the quantitative work (for matching velocity observations). Of course  (·), satisfies the usual monotonicity and convexity assumptions. There are two nominal assets: money  and bonds . The role of  is merely to compute an interest rate ( is not traded in equilibrium but we can still price it). There are three real assets: market capital   , residential structures   , and land   . As always.   is an input to the market production function  (     ). There is also a nonmarket production function  (     ), where   is nonmarket capital, which we sometimes call housing here, even though later we add consumer durables. Housing combines residential structures and land according to
11 Market capital and structures depreciate at rates   and   , while land does not depreciate and is fixed in supply, normalized to 1. The technologies  (·),  (·) and  (·) are strictly increasing, concave and display constant returns.
While the first-subperiod market is frictionless, the retail market is not. There are two distinct locations, one where agents have access to record keeping, and another where they do not. The measures of households that get to trade in the first and second locations are  1 and  2 , so  0 = 1 −  1 −  2 is the measure that do not get to trade at all. To remember the notation, the  in   refers to the number of payment instruments available: with probability  1 there is one, money; with probability  2 there two, money and credit; and probability  0 there are none.
Credit means acceptance by retailers of households' promises, to be honored in first-subperiod next period. When record keeping is not available, credit is impossible and trade requires currency. We assume the same measure of retailers and households trade in location ,  = 1 2, and since the ratio of retailers to households is , a given retailer trades in the credit market with probability  2 , and in the money market with probability  1 . All agents are price takers in all markets.
Households' Problems
At the start of each period, a household's state is a portfolio
plus outstanding debt from the previous period, . Given quasi-linear utility, without loss in generality we assume all debt is paid off in the first subperiod. Let  (z ) and  (ẑ   ) be the value functions in the first and second subperiods. The first-subperiod problem is
where   ,   and   are the prices of ,   and , respectively, and we define net wealth after a lump sum tax  by
Eliminating   reduces this to: 
In the second subperiod, three events may occur for households: with probability  0 they have no opportunity to trade in the retail market; with probability  1 they have an opportunity to trade using money; and with probability  2 they have an opportunity to trade using money or credit. Conditional on each event, the value function is denoted   (ẑ   ),  = 0 1 2, and  (ẑ
In what follows we evoke two standard results: First, in the money-only retail market households cash out -they bring no more money than they plan to spend in the event that credit is unavailable. Second, when credit is available agents are indifferent between using credit or cash -so without loss of generality we assume they use credit only.
The second-subperiod problem for households is to choose home work and consumption, where we mention that this is what motivated our timing assumptions:
we wanted them to have a chance to adjust home production after knowing their retail market outcomes. There are three such outcomes. For a household with no retail opportunity,  0  = 0 and
For a household with a money-only retail opportunity,  
where the cost of  for a household with a credit opportunity,
where  2 is the price. The solution satisfies
It is now routine to differentiate  (ẑ   ) and derive the Euler equationŝ
where
. These all have simple economic interpretations, e.g., (5) sets the marginal cost of a dollar on the LHS, to the marginal benefit on the RHS since a dollar is spent in the retail market with probability  1 and carried into the next period with probability 1 −  1 .
Also, (6) implies
where  =  0  − 1 is inflation. The real interest rate on a loan between the first subperiod at  and  + 1 is , and if we define the nominal rate  via the Fisher (11) says   = 1 (1 + ) Agents are happy with any  when this condition holds.
Firms' Problems
The representative production firm maximizes profit by hiring labor and capital,
where  and  are aggregates. The solution satisfies  =    1 ( ) and  =    2 ( ), and Π  = 0 by constant returns.
Retail firms purchase  and convert it into   , where for simplicity the conversion is one to one. They have an opportunity to sell it for money or credit in the retail market with probabilities  1  and  2 , resp. Because we assume that unsold inventory fully depreciates when the retail market closes, venders supply their wares inelastically, so  1  =  2  =  (consumption is the same in the cash and credit markets). Therefore, expected retail profit is
The first term on the RHS of (13) is the cost of inventories; the second is expected revenue from cash sales, discounted by   = 1 (1 + ) since this can only be dispersed next period; and the third is expected revenue from credit sales discounted the same way. The FOC is
Retailers are happy with any  if (14) holds, and Π  = 0. To pay for , in the first market, retailers issue bonds that households are happy to buy if   = 1 (1 + ).
Policy
Government controls the supply of money, which grows at rate . This can be implemented either using the lump sum tax/transfer  , or by spending new money on  (with quasi-linear utility, nothing depends on this except   ). Without loss of generality, we balance the budget each period. We focus on stationary outcomes where all real variables are constant, implying  = . Hence, it is equivalent to use the money growth rate or inflation rate as a policy instrument. Since 1 +  = (1 + ) (1 + ), it is also equivalent to use the nominal interest rate . Policy does not determine the real interest rate across periods; that is pinned down by the preference parameter .
Equilibrium
We first show how to express all prices (            1   2 ) in terms of the allocation. For factor prices we have
  is aggregate market hours and equilibrium requires   =  and  = . Note that for each household   =   (Ω) depends on their wealth at the start of the period, which differs according to their retail experience, but all we need to characterize macro equilibrium is  = R   (Ω). For land, (9) implies it is priced by its capitalized value as an input to housing, which is itself an input to the home production function,
Note on the RHS we divide by   and multiply by the wage , to convert utility into time and time into money. For bonds,   = 1 (1 + ). For retail prices, in the cash market we have  1  1  = = (1 + ) , and in the credit market we
Finally, from the retailers' FOC (14) we get the price level in the first subperiod,
This gives prices as functions of the allocation. In fact, we can pare down a description of an allocation as follows. In terms of land, structures and housing, since   = 1 and   =  (   1), we need only keep track of   . And in terms of
. So we can fully describe an allocation by retail inventories, market and home capital, and market and home work.
Definition 1 A steady state equilibrium is given by (
the FOC for home work conditional on retail experience
where it is understood that  (7)-(8)
a simplified version of the money Euler equation (5)
where  and  1 are as described above; plus (10) and aggregate feasibility
we can solve for prices as discussed above, plus some new variables. The average retail price and markup are
notice that      (a positive markup) due to search and inflation, not due to
as a price index, real GDP is
Velocity is  =   , and a standard notion of money demand is 1 =   
(Lucas 2000).
Finally, consider the price of a house   and value of the housing stock     , which is relevant given empirical results discussed earlier. If we introduce competitive home builders, the allocation is the same as if individuals build their own
houses; yet we can still imagine builders combining land and structures according to household specifications to deliver   =  (     ). The profit from this activity is
which is 0 in equilibrium. Thus
Simple Model: Analytic Results
The general framework is complicated, but we can simplify it to convey the intuition.
First, we eliminate investment by fixing market capital and structures at   and   , with   =   = 0. Then housing is fixed at   =  (   1). Also, for now, we simplify household production by setting   =   . Also, rather than trading   and   , households now trade   directly at price   , and trade   at price   . And we set  2 = 0 so there is no retail credit, and ignore bonds, so z = (      ). Finally, we ignore   and write utility as  (     ).
The Euler equations in this simple special case reduce tô
which are basically asset-pricing equations. In terms of the allocation, we can reduce the relevant conditions in this case to one equation in employment,
Then (25)- (26) deliver prices   ,   , and the relative price of housing,
depending on whether we deflate by the retail or wholesale price index.
The first result is that inflation reduces market work and consumption:
The effect on the relative price of housing is
if we take   as the deflator. The first term in the numerator is negative if   is a normal good, while the second is positive as long as   and   are substitutes,  21  0, which is the maintained assumption here, as it is the empirically relevant case (see the discussion of calibration). If  1 = 1 (no search frictions) the second term vanishes and     falls with . But when  1  1 there is second effect that goes the other way, and the net result is ambiguous. By contrast, deflating by   rather than   , we get
We can also deflate house prices by  and derive
If we deflate by nominal GDP defined using producer prices we again get a positive result. If we deflate by nominal GDP defined using consumer prices we get
The second and third terms on the RHS are positive, while the first term is positive iff −   11   1 . So as long as households are not too risk averse we also get a positive result deflating by GDP defined using consumer prices.
Of course, with   fixed, all the results about   can be restated as effects on the value of housing wealth     . We summarize all this as follows:
Proposition 2 In the simplified model described by (27),
We are most interested in the effects of  on housing wealth     , relative to either  or GDP, as discussed in the empirical work. The idea is that inflation affects the economy by creating an incentive to move economic activity out of the market and into the home. We have shown how these effects work qualitatively, and later we consider their magnitudes. Before that, however, we mention that the analytic results can be generalized to some degree, including the extension to a general home technology,   =  (     ). For this, we set  =  1 = 1 (no search) and still abstract from investment. Then we get two equations in time use,
These conditions exhibit an elegant symmetry between market and home hours, broken only by the channel we wish to highlight: the former is taxed by inflation while the latter is not.
It is easy to show   and   decrease with  while   and   increase with ,
given   and   are substitutes. Also,
where  0, at least if   and   are compliments. We can also show    increases with , and other results. Certainly the theory generates clean predictions, at least with capital fixed. Even with endogenous (     ) the model is tractable:
to (28)- (29) simply add
But it is time to move to computational methods.
General Model: Quantitative Results
We use standard technologies:
. We have to take a little more care with preferences, however, since there are three goods, (        ). 13 Hence, we consider two specifications, both of which seem a priori reasonable. In Calibration 1,   and   are perfect substitutes and we identify them collectively as market consumption:
Here 1(1 − ) is the EOS (elasticity of substitution) between market and home goods. In Calibration 2, we use:
Here  no longer directly captures the EOS we want to target, so we average (using expenditure shares) the EOS between   and   , which is 1, and between   and   , which is 1 (1 − ).
We use long-run observations to calibrate as many parameters as we can. Then, as is standard in monetary models, we use properties of the empirical money demand curve for some others. Unless otherwise noted, our targets are computed using US data, for the period 1975 to 1999 (since we are not attempting to explain the housing bubble). The length of a period is a quarter, although the results are robust to this choice. The average annual inflation rate and 3-month T-bill rate are 413% and 680% in the sample, which yield  = 00066 and  = 00103. We set   = 073
to match the value of residential structures plus durables relative to the value of 13 We cannot drop any one of these for the quantitative work, although we can for the theory. Of course we need   and   if we want to have money and home production, but what is perhaps more subtle is that we cannot drop   if we want to match velocity. This is something that never came up before combining monetary and home production theory. housing capital. Then, to match the investment flows over the capital stocks for both   and   we set   =   = 0015, which translates to 6% annual depreciation rates (it is a coincidence they are the same). We set  2 = 05 1 so that there are half as many retail trades with credit as there are with money, based on data from the recent Bank of Canada Methods of Payment Survey. 14 A key parameter in any model with home production is , as it governs the EOS between market and home goods. Therefore, we discuss this in more detail. In their original home production paper, Benhabib et al. (1991) argue for an EOS of 5, but in retrospect that was probably too high. Estimates by Rupert et al. (1995) using PSID data yield numbers closer to 18 definitive number coming out of these exercises, there is a consensus on a reasonable range, and as a compromise we use an EOS of 18, the median of these estimates.
In Calibration 1 this immediately implies  = 044, while in Calibration 2 we need to calibrate  jointly with the remaining parameters to match the EOS target.
At this point, for Calibration 1 the parameters (               1 ), and for Calibration 2 these plus , are calibrated to match the following targets. As is standard (Greenwood et al. 1995) households spend on average  = 33% of their discretionary time in the market and  = 25% in the home, while market capital over annual output is    = 207 and household capital over annual output is    = 196 (obviously we convert these to quarterly numbers). For the retail markup we target 30% based on data from the Annual Retail Trade Survey (Faig and Jerez 2005) . Finally, we match the level and slope of money demand, targeting an average annual velocity of 576 and a semi-elasticity with respect to  of 256%, obtained using a standard log-linear regression. While the parameters are calibrated jointly, heuristically   and   match the targets for hours,   and   match the capital-output ratios,  matches the markup,  matches the level of velocity and  1 matches the money-demand elasticity.
The top panel of Table 2 reports the calibration results. In Calibration 2  is 083, which implies a large EOS between   and   , but maintains the target EOS between overall market and nonmarket goods of 18. In terms of the retail market, consider Calibration 1 (the other is similar). The measure of retailers is  = 022, and the measure of households that trade each period is  1 +  2 = 017. Therefore
, is the fraction of retail inventories sold each period, while 17% of households make a purchase in the retail market each period. This means about 15% of market consumption is retail, while the rest is   , largely driven by average velocity in the data. To understand the importance of home production, we compute the percentage increase in market consumption required to compensate for the loss if home consumption set to 0. For households that are able to trade in the retail market, each period, market consumption has to increase by 77% to compensate for no home production. For households that cannot trade in the retail market, this number is 152%. Hence, all three consumption goods are economically important.
Positive Results
We now ask how well the model accounts for the facts discussed in Section 2: the relationship between the inflation or nominal interest rate, on the one hand, and the value of home capital over nominal output or over the money supply, on the other. Here we denote the value of home capital over nominal output and over the money supply by  and . These ratios are tightly connected to inverse velocity, , by the relationship  =  × . Since the average value of  and  are calibration targets, the average value of  matches the data, by construction. The only elasticity we target is the semi-elasticity of  with respect to the nominal rate, denoted   . The model generates endogenously a semi-elasticity for  , denoted   , and the elasticity of  then follows from
We are mainly interested in seeing how the model accounts for   . 15 We first compute the steady state for different values of  in the data between 1975-1999. This takes every year to be a steady state of the model with a particular , which is not strictly correct, due to the persistence of shocks and transitions, but it is a reasonable approximation given we are mainly interested in medium-to longrun phenomena. Then, among other statistics, for a particular variable of interest  we compute an elasticity by regressing log (  ) on a constant and . Table 2 reports the results and Figure 7 shows ,  and  vs  for Calibrations 1 and 2 as well as the data. In Calibration 1 we get   = 023 and in Calibration 2 we get   = 055, or 21% and 50% of the semi-elasticities in the data. 16 It therefore obviously matters which specification one uses -different ways a disaggregating market consumption into   and   are not equivalent, even when they are similar in terms of their predictions for the EOS. In any case, as Figure 7 shows, even though this is not a business-cycle analysis, we track the broad longer-run patterns in the data fairly well.
These findings are relatively robust. Changing the level of risk aversion from 1 to 12 or 2 has little effect. Nor does increasing the calibration frequency to monthly or even weekly. This is important, to us, because it is one of the reasons for modeling retail as a frictional market. With a typical cash-in-advance model,
where households spend all their money each period, there is no way to match velocity when the period is short. With our frictional retail market, we can shorten the period length and keep everything else basically the same by scaling the arrival rates. As regards the EOS target, varying this in the range 15 to 23 yields roughly similar results, although as the EOS increases the fraction of   accounted for by the model increases. In fact, if in Calibration 2 we use an EOS of 5, we can account for basically 100% of   . But an EOS of 5 is too high, given the body of empirical work. We prefer to conclude that for a reasonable EOS we can account for between 20% and 50% of the relationship.
Normative Results
We are also interested in how inflation affects welfare. There are different reasons for considering this issue. First, it is well known that models with explicit microfoundations for money can generate bigger costs of inflation than reduced-form models.
A standard exercise is to compute the cost of 10% inflation as the amount of consumption households would be willing to sacrifice to go from 10% to the Friedman rule, which means an inflation rate consistent with a 0 nominal interest rate. A consensus estimate from reduced-form analyses is that the answer is around 12 of 1% -e.g., see Lucas (2000) . By comparison, in models along the lines of Lagos and Wright (2005) the number can be an order of magnitude higher -e.g., see Aruoba et al. 2011 for more references. In fact, the main reason for the big welfare effects in Lagos and Wright (2005) and related models is that they use bargaining rather competitive pricing. Since it is well known that bargaining matters, we do not study that issue here. 17 What we ask is this: how does adding home production affect the results holding all else, including competitive pricing, fixed. Figure 8 shows how equilibrium changes with inflation for the two benchmark calibrations, as well as a version of the model with home production shut down. Since inflation is a tax on money holdings, higher inflation reduces real money balances and hence  1  , which reduces demand by retailers for inventories, and therefore employment and investment. In the model with no home production, market activity falls with inflation, and this creates a loss in welfare. With production, however, agents can make up for some of the lost market consumption by increasing home consumption. In the end, the cost of inflation is larger when home production is an option: going from 10% inflation to the Friedman rule implies a welfare gain of 04% without home production, 053%
in Calibration 1, and 066% in Calibration 2.
As in standard public finance, households' optimal behavior in response to an increase in the inflation tax is to reduce market and increase nonmarket activity.
Depending on the how willing an agent is to substitutue between home and market goods, individual welfare may be minimally affected by this. But if all agents try the same thing, aggregate demand for home capital and hence     rises, by about 015% as inflation goes up from the Friedman rule to 10% in Calibration 1.
Due to these general equilibrium effects, the increase in home consumption does not completely make up for the loss in market consumption. In Calibration 2   responds significantly more, due to the higher substitutability between   and   , and households increase their demand for housing so much that     grows by 17 Bargaining power is usually calibrated to match the markup in those models, which would be 0 with competitive pricing. Recall that we get a positive markup in our retail sector even with competitive pricing, due mainly to search frictions. about three times as much as in Calibration 1. So home production does make a difference, although perhaps not a dramatic difference. Still, while there is room for more work on this topic, we conlcude that it looks as though the microfoundations of household behavior matter, just like the microfoundations of monetary economics matter.
Conclusion
The preceding has been a report on our research trying to integrate models with money, household production and the production of housing. Our starting point was the view that home capital ought to be treated symmetrically with market capital, as both an output of and an input to production. We wanted to interact this with monetary theory because monetary policy provides incentives for agents to want to spend more or less time in market activity. Looking at some data, we found that appropriately-scaled values of the housing stock are higher when inflation or nominal interest rates are higher. We presented some theory that generates quite a few clean predictions, and in particualr predictions that are qualitatively consistent with these observations. We then explored some numerical work, asking how well calibrated versions of the model can account for these data. The finding was that we can account for a portion of what we found in the data, but far from all of it.
While this leaves is room for complementary explanations, it seems the channel we isolated is economically significant.
It would be nice to have additional data relating to our general hypothesis, that agents substitute in and out of home activity, relative to market activity, as incentives change, including tax incentives, including inflation tax incentives. Figure   9 is presented as a piece of suggestive evidence. It shows HP filtered (with parameter 100) series for inflation or nominal interest rates, appropriated-scaled value of housing capital, and unemployment for the period studied in the paper. It is obviously well known that inflation and nominal interest rates went from high to low over the period, and with this filtered data one can see clearly how the value of housing capital moved with these rates. Throwing unemployment into the mix at this stage is, again, only meant to be suggestive. The point it suggests is this:
if we interpret unemployment as indicating that agents are less inclined to work in the market -say, using higher reservation wages, or engaging in less search effort -it looks from this picture that the desire to work in the market tracks the value of home capital reasonably well. Future work should explore this in more detail, including building models explcitly incorporating unemployment. For now, we only say that Figure 8 seems consistent with our basic substantive hypothesis that inflation encourages people to substitute out of the market and into the home, which increases the demand for and hence price of inputs to home production. 
Welfare Gain
Inflation Notes: Red: Calibration 1, blue: Calibration 2, black: no home production. All quantities are relative to the value for 0% interest rate, expressed in percentage units except for welfare which shows the welfare gain of reducing the interest rate from the shown level to 0%, expressed in percentage of consumption. 
